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Imagine a product liability case in which the plaintiff has ad-
vanced evidence supporting two kinds of product defects: a manufac-
turing defect and a design defect. Six jurors believe a manufacturing
defect has been proven by a preponderance of the evidence, but do
not believe the design defect has been proven. The other six jurors be-
lieve that only the design defect has been sufficiently proven. If each
juror were to vote solely on the existence of any product defect, the
jury would return a unanimous verdict for the plaintiff.
Given a general verdict format, jurors probably will return a ver-
dict for the plaintiff, unless they question whether their disagreement
on the specifics invalidates that verdict. Given a specific verdict for-
mat asking separately about the design and manufacturing defects, the
jurors will probably return a verdict for the defendant, unless, given
that they all agree that the plaintiff should recover, they collude to
show some agreement where none existed. Thus, whether a specific or
general verdict form is submitted probably makes a difference in the
verdict rendered. Even more troubling is the fact that the basic ques-
tion arising from this situation has not been addressed by the presid-
ing judge: Must the jurors specifically agree on which product defect
existed?
Although this scenario seems likely to occur in product liability
cases, the question of specificity in a jury's agreement is not limited to
such cases. The problem can potentially arise in any case in which the
plaintiff alleges multiple sets of facts that would allow her to recover
from the defendant.' For example, a plaintiff could allege that the de-
fendant committed various negligent acts, where proof of any one of
the acts alleged would allow her to recover.2 This Comment focuses on
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1 Nor does this problem arise only when the plaintiff asserts multiple facts supporting
some aspect of her case. The defendant may also offer multiple facts supporting a certain de-
fense. One simple example is that a defendant trying to prove contributory negligence may as-
sert various sets of facts showing negligence by the plaintiff
2 The problem is most prevalent in tort cases, and consequently this Comment will focus
on that area. However, one can imagine other areas of the law where the problem could arise: for
example, those contesting a will might seek to establish lack of testamentary capacity through
different sets of facts. See, for example, Ipsen v Ruess, 241 Iowa 730, 41 NW2d 658, 664 (1950)
(holding that separate interrogatories alleging that the "deceased did not have mental capacity
(1), sufficient to know the extent of his property, (2), sufficient to know and comprehend in a
general way the natural objects of his bounty, and (3), sufficient to know the distribution of his
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the problem of juror specificity in tort cases in which the plaintiff al-
leges multiple sets of facts to prove a single element of a cause of ac-
tion such as negligence, product defect, or fraud.
This Comment begins with a discussion of the jury in Part I, in
particular focusing on Supreme Court decisions on the jury, special
verdicts and instructions, and models of juror decisionmaking and jury
deliberation. Part II considers case law dealing with juror specificity in
the civil context. It then describes how the Supreme Court has ad-
dressed the issue in the criminal context. Part III proposes a solu-
tion-that greater specificity should ordinarily be preferred. First, it
describes the problems with the current approaches. In reaching the
solution, the Comment draws analogies to the problem of specificity
in the criminal law context. Due process and fairness concerns, as well
as the purpose and strengths of the civil jury, support specificity. How-
ever, a significant exception exists in that specificity should not be re-
quired when a plaintiff is trying to prove her case using the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine.
This Comment does not suggest that specificity is constitutionally
mandated. Rather, it argues that judges, having great discretion in
choosing jury instructions, should require specificity because it is a
better policy than either failing to instruct the jury on the issue or in-
structing the jury that no agreement on specifics is required. Requir-
ing specificity will improve deliberation and help the jury fulfill its
factfinding mission.
I. THE JURY
This Part explores the nature of the jury by examining Supreme
Court decisions on the jury, as well as scholarship and studies on ju-
ries. Particular attention is paid to jury instructions, different types of
jury verdicts, juror decisionmaking, and jury deliberations.
A. The Nature and Purpose of the Jury
A good place to start is a discussion of Supreme Court cases that
give some idea about what a jury must and should be. The Supreme
Court has issued rulings dealing with the constitutional requirements
for jury size and decision rules. The Court has also discussed what the
purpose of the civil jury should be.
estate that he wished to make" were improper because only agreement on the ultimate facts was
necessary). The problem may also arise in contract cases when, for example, the plaintiff tries to
prove through different means that a certain person is an agent of the defendant. See, for exam-
ple, Parrott v Thacher, 26 Mass 426,431-32 (1830) (holding that the jurors must agree on whether
agency was proved through usage or through the fact that the article purchased by the alleged
agent came to the use of the owners).
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1. Jury size and decision rules.
Prior to the 1970s, civil and criminal juries in the United States
generally consisted of twelve members and returned unanimous ver-
dicts.3 However, the Supreme Court later decided that in many situa-
tions juries could consist of fewer than twelve members and reach less
than unanimous verdicts.4 Federal criminal juries must still consist of
twelve members and decide unanimously. 5 Federal civil juries may
consist of six members, though they are still required to decide
unanimously. 6 State courts may have smaller juries and less stringent
decisional rules even in the criminal setting, since the Fourteenth
Amendment does not extend such incidents of the jury to the states.
Although few states have adopted nonunanimous verdicts in criminal
cases,8 many states have adopted some sort of supermajority require-
ment for juries in civil trials
Some scholars suggest that jury theory supports a view of the jury
as a collection of individuals rather than a coherent group.' Hayden J.
3 See Valerie P. Hans and Neil Vidmar, Judging the Jury 165-76 (Plenum 1986) (describing
Supreme Court decisions on jury size and decision rules).
4 See id at 166, 168, 173. See also Johnson v Louisiana, 406 US 356, 363 (1972) (holding
that a verdict rendered by nine out of twelve jurors in a state criminal trial was not a violation of
due process); Williams v Florida, 399 US 78, 86 (1970) (holding that a twelve-person jury is not a
necessary ingredient of trial by jury and that a jury of six persons was constitutional in a state
criminal trial).
5 FRCrP 23(b) (size of jury); FRCrP 31(a) (unanimity requirement).
6 Colgrove v Battin, 413 US 149,160 (1973);American Publishing Co v Fisher, 166 US 464,
467-68 (1897) (requiring unanimity for federal civil jury trials under the Seventh Amendment).
See also Johnson, 406 US at 369-70 (Powell concurring) (noting that unanimity is an indispensa-
ble feature of the federal jury trial). In 1991, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended
to reflect this change, given that many federal district courts were then seating juries of six as a
matter of course. FRCP 48, Advisory Committee's Note to the 1991 Amendments. Verdicts are
generally required to be unanimous, though the parties may stipulate to some sort of majority
verdict. Id. Parties may also stipulate to fewer than six jurors, see FRCP 48, although this is dis-
couraged, because the Court disallowed criminal juries of fewer than six in Ballew v Georgia, 435
US 223,239 (1978).
7 See, for example, Johnson, 406 US at 363; Williams, 399 US at 86.
8 Louisiana and Oregon, whose nonunanimous verdicts were originally challenged and
found constitutional in the 19 70 s, are still the only states to allow nonunanimous criminal ver-
dicts. See Kate Stith-Cabranes, The Criminal Jury in Our Tune, 3 Va J Soc Pol & L 133, 141-42
(1995) (noting that other states have considered making the change).
9 Saul Levmore, Conjunction and Aggregation, 99 Mich L Rev 723, 740 n 33 (2001)
("Roughly speaking, more than a third of the states require unanimity in civil cases.").
10 See Hayden J. Trubitt, Patchwork Verdicts; Different-Jurors Verdicts, and American Jury
Theory: Whether Verdicts Are Invalidated by Juror Disagreement on Issues, 36 Okla L Rev 473,
476-77 (1983) (specifically discussing Johnson as supporting the ideal of individualism). Trubitt
adopts the name "patchwork verdict" for verdicts where the jurors agree on the general verdict
but disagree on the particulars behind the verdict. Id at 474 n 1 (noting that the term was coined
in Comment, Right to Jury Unanimity on Material Fact Issues: United States v. Gipson, 91 Harv L
Rev 499 (1977)). Justice Ginsburg has also argued that the nature of the jury as a group of indi-
viduals counsels that agreement on specifics should not be required; however, her article was
written before the Supreme Court rendered its decisions on jury size and decision rules. See
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Trubitt argued that agreement on specifics should not be required be-
cause a jury is a collection of individuals. Trubitt reasoned that by al-
lowing nonunanimous verdicts, the Supreme Court demonstrated a
commitment to individualism, since "if the jury is thought to be a sin-
gle holistic entity, the dissent of [any] jurors" should prevent the jury
from rendering a verdict.. Therefore, Trubitt proposed that civil
"[p]atchwork verdicts are, in general, valid and proper.,' 2 He sug-
gested an exception to this rule "where the 'patched' grounds are not
part of a sole transaction, do not have a common focus of injury, or do
not call for exactly the same remedy."" Although Trubitt drew from
Court decisions suggesting that the jury is a collection of individuals,
the Court has equally emphasized the jury as a deliberative body."
2. Jury as factfinder.
The most important mission of the jury, at least in civil cases, is to
determine what facts have been proven. Historically, juries have it
within their power to judge both law and fact. 5 With a general verdict,
a jury is instructed on the law and is presumed to follow these instruc-
tions. 6 Many issues cannot easily be split into law and fact, and the
jury ends up deciding mixed issues, such as negligence.'
7
In the criminal context, juries continue to decide facts and apply
law to these facts,"' but some of the civil jury's lawmaking power has
been taken over by judges, particularly through devices such as the
special verdict. '9 The civil jury continues to be generally respected as a
Ruth B. Ginsburg, Special Findings and Jury Unanimity in the Federal Courts, 65 Colum L Rev
256,268 (1965) (rejecting the "particular fact definition" because "rigidly and unrealistically, [it]
equates the collective judgment of twelve with the individual judgment of a single trier").
11 Trubitt, 36 Okla L Rev at 476 (cited in note 10) ("The theme of individualism focuses on
the means by which verdicts are rendered. Ideally, a verdict is a concurrence of the views of all
jurors, each view representing an individual and independent assessment of the evidence.").
12 Idat511.
13 Id.
14 For more on the importance of the jury as a deliberative body, see Part I.C.2.
15 See, for example, Georgia v Brailsford, 3 US (3 Dall) 1, 4 (1794) (charging the jury:
"[A]s, on the one hand, it is presumed, that juries are the best judges of facts; it is, on the other
hand, presumable, that the court are [sic] the best judges of law. But still, both objects are law-
fully within your power of decision.").
16 See, for example, Richardson v Marsh, 481 US 200,211 (1987) (noting the pragmatic rule
that juries are presumed to follow their instructions).
17 See, for example, Isham v Post, 141 NY 100, 35 NE 1084, 1085 (1894) ("Negligence is
usually a mixed question of law and fact."). See also Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts 258 (West
2000) ("Overall, juries are a highly significant force in deciding negligence and are subject to
fewer restrictions than in some other kinds of tort cases.").
18 United States v Gaudin, 515 US 506,511-15 (1995) (concluding that the jury's responsi-
bility is not merely to determine facts but to apply law to those facts and make the ultimate con-
clusions as to guilt or innocence).
19 See Part I.B.2 for a discussion of special verdicts and general verdicts accompanied by
interrogatories.
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factfinding institution.0 The criminal jury has an additional function
beyond factfinding: to stand between the defendant and the govern-
ment.2 ' However, the purpose of the civil jury is "to assure a fair and
equitable resolution of factual issues."2 Since civil juries serve no pro-
tective function, their role as factfinding bodies is comparatively more
important.
B. Instructing and Controlling the Jury
This Part discusses the literature on jury instructions, noting that
greater clarity in jury instructions is generally desirable. It also consid-
ers different verdict structures, particularly emphasizing the special
verdict, which attempts to remove some lawmaking ability from the
jury.
1. Jury instructions.
The literature reveals considerable doubts about how closely ju-
ries follow jury instructions. Doubts about the efficacy of jury instruc-
tions come from both the nature of jury instructions and beliefs about
the competence of the jury.'
Jury instructions have faced much criticism for their lack of clar-
ity. Most states encourage judges to use "pattern," "standard," or
"uniform" jury instructions.24 Such pattern instructions are often writ-
ten with more attention to precise legal accuracy than to clarity of in-
struction.2 Some scholars have suggested that jury instructions could
20 Hans and Vidmar, Judging the Jury at 245 (cited in note 3) (concluding that juries are
generally competent factfinders). However, some commentators and courts have suggested that
the jury be abolished in complex civil cases. See generally Richard Lempert, Civil Juries and
Complex Cases: Taking Stock after Twelve Years, in Robert E. Litan, ed, Verdict: Assessing the
Civil Jury System 181 (Brookings 1993) (discussing the debate over whether a complexity excep-
tion should be read into the Seventh Amendment).
21 Duncan v Louisiana, 391 US 145,156 (1968):
Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestima-
ble safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant,
biased, or eccentric judge. If the defendant preferred the common-sense judgment of a jury
to the more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was to
have it.
22 Colgrove v Battin, 413 US 149,157 (1973).
23 The question of the jury's general competence is beyond the scope of this Comment, but
for a general discussion of the debate on jury competence, see Hans and Vidmar, Judging the
Jury at 113-29 (cited in note 3) (concluding that juries are generally competent).
24 See Amiram Elwork, James J. Alfini, and Bruce D. Sales, Toward Understandable Jury
Instructions, in Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Saul M. Kassin, and Cynthia E. Willis, eds, In the Jury
Box: Controversies in the Courtroom 161,162 (Sage 1987).
25 See Jonathan D. Casper, Restructuring the Traditional Civil Jury: The Effects of Changes
in Composition and Procedures, in Robert E. Litan, ed, Verdict: Assessing the Civil Jury System
414,444 (Brookings 1993) (describing pattern instructions as containing "highly complex circum-
locutions, arcane language and concepts, and elaborate series of contingent judgments"). See also
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be rewritten to be more comprehensible.2 Others argue that confusing
jury instructions are unavoidable because they reflect the complexity
of the law; any attempt to clarify jury instructions will result in incor-
rect statements of the law.27
Pattern jury instructions for civil cases do not recognize the issue
of specificity of juror agreement. Some of them suggest that agree-
ment on specificity may not be required, since they instruct the jurors
that they need only agree on elements.2 Others, by referring more
specifically to the facts, suggest that agreement may be required79
Nonetheless, none of the instructions explicitly addresses the issue of
specificity of juror agreement, so jurors are left largely to their own
devices.
2. Types of verdicts.
One development that has greatly changed the jury system in
civil cases over the last forty years is the growing acceptance and use
of the special verdict.3 Special verdicts come in many different forms,
Elwork, Alfini, and Sales, Toward Understandable Jury Instructions at 162 (cited in note 24) (not-
ing that although pattern instructions may conserve lawyers' and judges' time and reduce the
number of reversals based on legally erroneous instructions, they do not seem to increase jurors'
comprehension); Saul M. Kassin and Lawrence S. Wrightsman, The American Jury on Trial:
Psychological Perspectives 149 (Hemisphere 1988) (arguing that problems with jury competence
arise not from "jury comprehension, but the comprehensibility of judges' instructions"); Hans and
Vidmar, Judging the Jury at 120-24 (cited in note 3) (describing how the clarity of jury instruc-
tions can be enhanced without sacrificing legal accuracy).
26 See Elwork, Alfini, and Sales, Toward Understandable Jury Instructions at 176 (cited in
note 24) (summarizing a mock jury study that suggested that juror comprehension of judicial in-
structions could be increased significantly by using simpler instructions).
27 See, for example, Kassin and Wrightsman, The American Jury on Trial at 151 (cited in
note 25), quoting BAJI (4th ed 1954) (noting that the authors of some jury instructions claim that
"the one thing an instruction must do above all else is correctly state the law. This is true regard-
less of who is capable of understanding it.").
28 See, for example, Michigan Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions, 1
Michigan Standard Jury Instructions § 16.02 (Inst for Continuing Legal Educ 2d ed 1998) ("The
plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions: a. that the plaintiff was
injured[;] b. that the defendant was negligent in one or more of the ways claimed by the plaintiff;
as stated to you in these instructions[;] c. that the negligence of the defendant was a proximate
cause of the injuries to the plaintiff."); Oregon State Bar Committee on Uniform Civil Jury In-
structions, Oregon Jury Instructions for Civil Cases § 20.01 (Or State Bar 1993) ("To recover, the
plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was negligent in at
least one respect charged in the plaintiff's complaint which was a cause of damage to the plain-
tiff").
29 See, for example, Walter L. Murphy and Daniel C. Pope, eds, New Hampshire Civil Jury
Instructions § 1.1 (Matthew Bender 3d ed 2000) ("This is a civil action in which the plaintiff [ ]
has sued the defendant [ ] to recover money damages for [ ] sustained on [ ] at [ ]. (Describe
briefly the plaintiff's claim). The plaintiff claims: (State essential elements of the claim, making
reference to time, place, and circumstances).").
30 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize the use of special verdicts and interroga-
tories. FRCP 49. Most state procedures also allow some sort of special verdict or general verdict
with interrogatories. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Colin C. Tait, and William A. Fletcher, Pleading and
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and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49 gives considerable discretion
to the trial judge in deciding whether to use a general verdict, a special
verdict, or a general verdict with interrogatories. 3 ' The special verdict
is to be "in the form of a special written finding upon each issue of
fact." 3 The judge then applies the law to the jury's findings and enters
the appropriate verdict.33
The judge may also submit a general verdict with written inter-
rogatories "upon one or more issues of fact the decision of which is
necessary to a verdict."'' If the general verdict and the interrogatories
are harmonious, the judge enters the appropriate judgment. 3  How-
ever, if the general verdict and the interrogatories conflict, the judge
may decide to enter a judgment in accordance with the interrogato-
ries."' He may also send the jury back for further deliberations on its
answers or verdict or order a new trial.f
The special verdict, especially one that asks the jury only to de-
termine issues of fact, essentially takes away any law-determining abil-
ity that might be within the jury's power.3M Special verdicts originally
received both praise and criticism because they were used to keep the
jury in the dark about the significance of their answers. 9 However, ju-
ries today are routinely informed on how their answers to a special
verdict will affect the verdict.40
Procedure: State and Federal 1230 (Foundation 8th ed 1999) ("[Most state procedures have
permissible variations [of special verdicts], which include a general verdict accompanied by spe-
cial findings or by answers to special interrogatories.").
31 See Robert M. Dudnik, Comment, Special Verdicts: Rule 49 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 74 Yale L J 483,483 (1965) (describing the discretionary choice left to the judges and








33 G.Thomas Munsterman, Paula L. Hannaford, and G. Marc Whitehead, eds, Jury Trial In-
novations 189 (National Center for State Courts 1997) ("Special verdicts constrain the jury's pre-
rogatives and its ability to dispense a 'people's justice."').
39 Martin A. Kotler, Reappraising the Jury's Role as Finder of Fact, 20 Ga L Rev 123,135 &
n 34 (1985) (indicating that traditionally juries were not informed of the legal effect of their an-
swers in special findings because this would defeat the use of the special verdict "'to secure fair
and impartial answers to such questions'), quoting Coats v Town of Stanton, 90 Wis 130,62 NW
619,621 (1895). See also Dudnik, Comment, 74 Yale L J at 493 (cited in note 31) (noting the tra-
ditional premise that the average juror will have no common knowledge of the relationship be-
tween the ultimate facts he is called upon to find and the result that would follow, and rejecting
this premise as unsound).
40 Kotler, 20 Ga L Rev at 124 (cited in note 39) (noting that only a small minority of
jurisdictions now follow the traditional rule of nondisclosure).
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Long before the adoption of Rule 49, the special verdict was seen
as a way of controlling the jury.41 Even more than jury instructions, the
special verdict requires careful application, because it greatly de-
creases the jury's flexibility in making its decision and leaves the jury
42
only factfinding powers.
The use of special verdicts and interrogatories raises the question
of how specific such questions should be. The Rules instruct that spe-
cial verdicts are submitted "upon each issue of fact. 4 1 Interrogatories
may be submitted "upon one or more issues of fact the decision of
which is necessary to a verdict."" However, this rule still gives little
guidance as to how specific such special verdicts should be.5
C. Decisionmaking and Deliberation
This Part discusses how jurors and juries render verdicts. First, it
considers how individual jurors evaluate evidence and make decisions
on guilt or liability. Second, it discusses what happens when jurors de-
liberate collectively in order to reach a decision that represents the
findings of the jury.
1. Models of individual juror decisionmaking.
This Part describes two models of individual juror decisionmak-
ing: the story model and the meter-reader model. Some scholars sug-
gest that a juror's approach to evidence resembles an attempt to con-
struct a plausible story rather than an element-by-element approach.4
The model suggests that jurors impose a narrative story organization
41on the information they receive at trial. Moreover, litigators may
41 See, for example, Dudnik, Comment, 74 Yale L J at 489-91 (cited in note 31) (describing
how early proponents of the special verdict argued that the "merger of fact and law in the gen-
eral verdict [ I made it impossible for courts to exercise control over irresponsible jurors because
there was no way to tell what facts had been found nor what law had been applied").
42 See id at 490 (stating that supporters "claimed that the jury would be confined to its
proper role as an impartial, rational finder of fact").
43 FRCP 49(a).
44 FRCP 49(b).
45 Munsterman, Hannaford, and Whitehead, eds, Jury Trial Innovations at 187 (cited in
note 38) (noting that the appropriate specificity level of special verdicts is an open question). See
also Elizabeth C. Wiggins and Steven J. Breckler, Special Verdicts as Guides to Jury Decision
Making, 14 L & Psych Rev 1, 3 n 7 (1990) (noting that because of the latitude given the trial
judge, special verdicts may consist of fairly precise factual questions or mixed questions of law
and fact).
46 See Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie, The Story Model for Juror Decision Making, in
Reid Hastie, ed, Inside the Juror: The Psychology of Juror Decision Making 192, 192-203 (Cam-
bridge 1993) (suggesting that jurors evaluate evidence to construct a story and then match the
story to the best-fitting verdict category). See also Richard Lempert, Telling Tales in Court: Trial
Procedure and the Story Model, 13 Cardozo L Rev 559,559 (1991) (evaluating the role that sto-
ries play in the trial process).
47 Pennington and Hastie, The Story Model at 194 (cited in note 46).
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contribute to the story effect, since they may present the case as a
story, instinctively sensing that is how jurors best process informa-
tion. '
Although all jurors hear the same information, a central claim of
the story model is that different jurors will construct different stories,
and each juror's story will determine the verdict that the juror reaches
individually.1 The different stories the jurors construct do not depend
so much on the information they receive at trial, which is roughly simi-
lar for all jurors, but rather.on the differences in world knowledge
among the jurors. ' These differences in world knowledge lead jurors
to make different inferences from the evidence.1
The story model contrasts with another model of juror decision-
making, the juror as "meter reader." 2 Meter-reader models assume
that jurors use a quantitative approach to the evidence.0 Such models
focus on a process called "anchoring and adjustment," where "the ju-
ror anchors on some initial value and then adjusts this value in light of
each new piece of evidence."" Although it is uncertain which of these
models is a more accurate description of the juror's decisionmaking,
evidence seems to suggest that there is some truth in each.5
2. The jury as deliberative body.
Although models of individual juror decisionmaking can shed
some light on jury behavior, the jury is ultimately a deliberative deci-
sionmaking body. In its cases on the constitutional requirements for
the size of the jury, the Supreme Court has noted, "What is required
for a 'jury' is a number large enough to facilitate group deliberation
combined with a likelihood of obtaining a representative cross section
48 See Lempert, 13 Cardozo L Rev at 562 (cited in note 46) (finding that juries tend to
evaluate veracity on the basis of the coherency of the story offered at trial).
49 Pennington and Hastie, The Story Model at 196 (cited in note 46).
50 Id.
51 Id. For example, some jurors might think a confrontation with a bully might make the
defendant frightened (leading toward a finding of self-defense), but other jurors might believe
the confrontation would be a challenge to manly pride resulting in anger (leading away from a
finding of self-defense). Id at 195-96.
52 See Lola Lopes, Two Conceptions of the Juror, in Reid Hastie, ed, Inside the Juror: The
Psychology of Juror Decision Making 255 (Cambridge 1993). See also Robert MacCoun, Inside
the Black Box: What Empirical Research Tells Us about Decisionmaking by Civil Juries, in Robert
E. Litan, ed, Verdict'Assessing the Civil Jury System 137,152 (Brookings 1993).
53 Lopes, Two Conceptions of the Juror at 255 (cited in note 52). Scholars have articulated
many different subtheories about how jurors use quantitative methods in approaching decision-
making. See Reid Hastie, Introduction, in Reid Hastie, ed, Inside the Juror: The Psychology of Ju-
ror Decision Making 3,10-22 (Cambridge 1993) (describing models based on probability theory,
"cognitive" algebra, and stochastic processes).
54 MacCoun, Inside the Black Box at 152 (cited in note 52).
55 Id at 153.
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of the community."' The Court professes great faith in the ability of
the jury to deliberate fairly and reasonably, even when a unanimous
verdict is not required.7
The importance of deliberation is highlighted by studies suggest-
ing that with as many as nine out of ten juries, the verdict reached
matches the original verdict preferences of the jurors.! Even if this
percentage is correct, it still means that in one out of ten cases, delib-
eration may change a jury's verdict. Thus, fairness dictates that delib-
eration should be encouraged through whatever tools necessary.9 De-
liberation is vital no matter which model of individual juror decision-
making is accurate. If jurors act more as meter-readers, deliberation
will force them to consider bits of evidence that they may have over-
looked. If juror decisionmaking conforms to the story model, delibera-
tion will ensure that jurors reach appropriately coherent stories that
take into account all of the evidence presented at trial.6°
II. CASE LAW ON SPECIFICITY REQUIREMENTS
Although juries must face this issue relatively often, whenever
plaintiffs or defendants plead multiple facts, courts have addressed the
problem only rarely. This Part examines approaches in two different
states, California and Kansas, that have faced the issue relatively re-
cently.6 This Part also describes how the Supreme Court has decided
the issue of specificity in the criminal context.
56 Colgrove v Battin, 413 US 149,160 n 16 (1973).
57 Johnson v Louisiana, 406 US 356,361 (1972):
We have no grounds for believing that majority jurors, aware of their responsibility and
power over the liberty of the defendant, would simply refuse to listen to arguments pre-
sented to them in favor of acquittal, terminate discussion, and render a verdict .... A major-
ity will cease discussion and outvote a minority only after reasoned discussion has ceased to
have persuasive effect or to serve any other purpose.
Compare id at 388 (Douglas dissenting) ("[N]onunanimous juries need not debate and deliber-
ate as fully as must unanimous juries. As soon as the requisite majority is attained, further con-
sideration is not required either by Oregon or by Louisiana even though the dissident jurors
might, if given the chance, be able to convince the majority.").
58 Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Some Steps between Attitudes and Verdicts, in Reid Hastie, ed, In-
side the Juror: The Psychology of Juror Decision Making 42, 58 (Cambridge 1993)
(acknowledging the nine out of ten figure, but arguing that three out of four may be the closer
figure).
59 Id at 58-59 (noting that a convicted defendant would surely feel cheated if the jury re-
turned a verdict after an initial vote without deliberation).
60 For a discussion of how requiring specificity will encourage deliberation, see text ac-
companying notes 147-52.
61 There are several earlier examples where courts dealt with the problem of specificity of
juror agreement, but this Comment does not focus on such cases, which have already been dis-
cussed in other commentaries. See, for example, Ginsburg, 65 Colum L Rev at 260-62 (cited in
note 10); Patrick Woolley, Mass Tort Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Reexamination
Clause, 83 Iowa L Rev 499,529-30 nn 149-52 (1998).
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A. California: The Primary Rights Theory
A California appellate court first addressed the problem of what
jurors must agree on in civil cases in Stoner v Williams."2 Stoner
brought a fraud action against an adoption agency and Williams, one
of its employees, alleging that the defendants had committed fraudu-
lent acts in convincing her to give up her baby for adoption."' The
plaintiff had the burden of proving the facts necessary to establish one
or more of the seven fraudulent acts alleged.6' After one day of delib-
eration, the jury asked the court whether "a minimum of 9 jurors need
to agree that the same allegation[ ] has been proven or could some
agree that one has been proven and others a different one as long as 9
agree that at least one has been proven."'' The court responded that it
was not necessary that nine jurors agree on a specific fraudulent act of
the seven alleged, as long as each of the nine believed that any one of
the fraudulent acts had been committed." The jury returned a verdict
in favor of Stoner -shortly thereafter. The adoption agency appealed
the case and a California appellate court affirmed."
Expressing surprise that it was unable to find any authority ad-
dressing the question of juror agreement in the civil context, the ap-
pellate court turned to the criminal context.69 Under California law:
[I]f only one criminal offense could exist as a result of the com-
mission of various acts, the jury need not agree on which particu-
lar act (or legal theory) a criminal conviction is based, provided
the jurors unanimously agree that all elements of the criminal of-
fense are proved beyond a reasonable doubt.70
62 46 Cal App 4th 986,54 Cal Rptr 2d 243 (1996).
63 54 Cal Rptr 2d at 245-46.
64 Id at 246-47. The fraudulent acts alleged included misrepresentation of the full range of
alternatives open to Stoner, concealment of the fact that the adoption agency was unlicensed,
and assumption by the adoption agency and its employees of the role of Stoner's advocate in
representing her interests. Id.
65 Id at 247. California law allows civil verdicts to be rendered by nine out of twelve jurors.
Id at 254.
66 Id at 247. The trial court judge explained his reasoning with a comparison:
I analogize it to an automobile accident case where you might have somebody who is
speeding, improperly making a turn and maybe had a few drinks. And when the jury is
asked whether the defendant was negligent, they can have different decisions. One can de-
cide he was negligent because he was speeding and one can decide he was negligent be-
cause of the turn issue. They don't have to agree on the same act. They have to agree that
the act was negligent and that the negligence caused injury.
Id at 248.
67 Id at 247.
6s Id at 244.
69 Id at 248-49.
70 Id at 249.
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The court also noted that the vast majority of other state and fed-
7'
eral courts agreed on this standard for criminal cases.
Although admitting that "comparing civil law with criminal law is
sometimes like comparing apples with oranges," the court believed
the comparison was useful here.7 Since the criminal law system gener-
ally places a higher burden on the prosecutor than the civil law places
on the plaintiff, the court determined that the rules of jury agreement
should not be more onerous for the civil plaintiff than for the criminal
prosecutor." Criminal juries must agree on the same ultimate criminal
offense, but not on the theory behind the offense (for example, com-
mitting the offense or aiding and abetting) or on the acts performed in
committing the offense.7 The Stoner court likened a single, discrete
criminal offense to a single cause of action in a civil case.75 Therefore,
civil juries must agree that each of the elements of a single cause of
action has been proven, but do not need to agree on the specific way
in which each element is proven. The court noted that especially if
multiple causes of actions were charged in the same civil case, it would
be important to instruct the jurors that they would have to agree on
the same cause of action and not simply on the end result of liability.
7
1
The court then discussed the appropriate way in which to define a
single cause of action. It determined that the primary rights theory
was the appropriate way to ascertain whether multiple causes of ac-
tion existed." Under the primary rights theory, the invasion of a single
primary right leads to a single cause of action.78 Thus, the court must
look to the harm allegedly suffered by the plaintiff rather than the le-
gal theory asserted.7 ' If the plaintiff has suffered one injury, then only
one cause of action arises
Applying the primary rights theory to the Stoner case, the court
held that the injury was the "personal injury [plaintiff] suffered as the
result of the loss of her child." 8' The seven fraudulent acts alleged
caused that same injury and were violations of the same primary
right2 Therefore, the court appropriately instructed the jurors that
they need not agree on the specific fraudulent act performed.
71 Id at 251 (collecting cases).
72 Id.
73 Id at 251-52.








82 Id at 253-54.
83 Id.
[69:379
Specificity and Jury Agreement
In Valentine v Baxter Healthcare Corp,n another California appel-
late court revisited the issue of specific agreement among jurors and
applied the reasoning in Stoner to a product liability case. The plaintiff
in Valentine sued a breast implant manufacturer on behalf of his de-
ceased wife."" After one trial in which the jury found for the defendant
on some issues and hung on others, there was a second trial." At that
trial, the court gave the jury specific instructions on five negligence
theories: design, testing, inspection, warning, and manufacture.7 Ap-
plying the primary rights theory, the appellate court noted that the
single primary right injured by the breast implant manufacturer was
the right not to be supplied with a negligently made implant." Though
affirming the reasoning of Stoner, the court held that the submission
of special verdicts did not harm the plaintiff here because nine jurors
still did not concur on causation.9
B. Kansas: An Intuitive Approach
Although the California courts have given the most comprehen-
sive recent attention to the question of specificity of jury agreement in
civil trials, the Kansas Supreme Court has also addressed the issue, de-
ciding that allowing disagreement on specifics was more intuitively at-
tractive.
In Cleveland v Wong,' a medical malpractice case, the trial judge
instructed the jury on six different claims of negligence, including fail-
ure to prescribe an appropriate antibiotic, performing surgery without
adequate medical justification, and various negligent acts done during
the course of surgery.9' The jurors sent a question to the judge asking
whether they needed to agree on a specific negligent act or could
merely agree on the existence of negligence2 The judge instructed the
jurors that they need agree only on the existence of negligence, not on
a specific act.n
84 68 Cal App 4th 1467,81 Cal Rptr 2d 252 (1999).
85 81 Cal Rptr 2d at 254,255 n 1.
86 Id at 254 (noting that the first jury found for the defense on strict liability and fraud but
hung on the causation element of the negligence count).
87 Id at 261 & n 11.
88 Id at 265. The court also noted that negligent failure to warn might involve a separate
primary right than the other negligence claims; however, that was irrelevant since the negligent
failure to warn should not have been argued in the second trial at all. Id at 265-66 n 15.
89 Id at 265-66.
90 237 Kan 410,701 P2d 1301 (1985).
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The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed. Unlike the California
courts, the Kansas court offered no theory, just common sense, re-
marking:
In a negligence case involving automobiles, if half of the jurors
determine that the defendant failed to keep a proper lookout,
and that such failure caused the collision and plaintiff's resulting
injuries and damages, and the other half of the jurors determine
that the defendant ran a stop sign, thus causing the collision and
the injuries complained of, and assuming that there is evidence to
support both, should the plaintiff be denied recovery?6
Thus, both Kansas and California reached the same determina-
tion that specificity should be required, although they used very dif-
ferent reasoning to reach their conclusions.
C. Schad v Arizona: A Supreme Court Decision on Specificity in the
Criminal Law Context
In the criminal law context, there have been more cases discuss-
ing what juries must decide with specificity, including Supreme Court
decisions. Analogies to the criminal law can be useful in this area,
since basic values of the jury system are common to both the criminal
and civil law situations.
One important case in this area is Schad v Arizona." Schad was
convicted of first-degree murder under an Arizona statute that defines
first-degree murder as either premeditated murder or felony murder.9
At the defendant's trial, the prosecutor argued both theories.6 The
court instructed the jury that first-degree murder was the result of
premeditation and that murder committed during an attempted rob-
bery is also first-degree murder." The jury was then instructed that it
must unanimously agree "whether the verdict is guilty or not guilty.""9
The court gave the jury three choices: guilty of first-degree murder,
guilty of second-degree murder, and not guilty."° The Arizona Su-
preme Court affirmed the conviction, and the U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine "whether it was constitutionally ac-
ceptable to permit the jurors to reach one verdict based on any com-
bination of the alternative findings."''
94 Id at 1308.
95 501 US 624 (1991).
96 See id at 628.




101 Id at 629-30.
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The Supreme Court noted that it was a longstanding rule that "an
indictment need not specify which overt act, among several named,
was the means by which a crime was committed. '' 'n Furthermore, this
rule is embodied in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
provide: "It may be alleged in a single count that the means by which
the defendant committed the offense are unknown or that the defen-
dant committed it by one or more specified means."'
The Court emphasized that a state has wide latitude in defining
alternative means by which a crime may be proven.u However, de-
spite such deference, there are limits on the state's power in defining
crimes."6 The problem is to describe "the point at which differences
between means become so important that they may not reasonably be
viewed as alternatives to a common end, but must be treated as differ-
entiating what the Constitution requires to be treated as separate of-
fenses."' ° The Court had never defined exactly how to determine that
point. Much of the prior case law on how to distinguish between le-
gitimate alternative means and differentiated offenses came from a
Fifth Circuit case, United States v Gipson."
In Gipson, the defendant was charged with violating 18 USC
§ 2313, which prohibited knowingly "receiving, concealing, storing,
bartering, selling or disposing" of any stolen vehicle moving in inter-
state commerce."3 The defendant was convicted after the trial judge
instructed the jurors that they need not agree on which of the enu-
merated acts the defendant had committed. The Fifth Circuit reversed
the conviction, reasoning that the enumerated acts actually consisted
of two distinct conceptual groupings, "housing" and "marketing."' '
According to the Gipson court, when acts are within the same concep-
tual grouping, the jurors need not agree on which specific act was per-
formed.!0 A number of lower courts adopted the conceptual grouping
test.'
102 Id at 631. For example, the Court had sustained a murder conviction in which the Gov-
ernment advanced theories of both shooting and drowning. Andersen v United States, 170 US
481, 492-94 (1898).The Court has also approved convictions in which the charge failed to specify
which of three defendants did the actual killing and which were guilty on an accomplice theory.
See Borun v United States, 284 US 596,596-97 (1932).
103 Schad, 501 US at 631 (internal quotation marks omitted), quoting FRCrP 7(c)(1).
104 Schad, 501 US at 638 ("Respect for [ legislative competence counsels restraint against
judicial second-guessing.").
105 Id at 639 (noting that although the state legislature's definition is usually dispositive,
"'there are obviously constitutional limits beyond which the States may not go"'), quoting Patter-
son v New York, 432 US 197,210 (1977).
106 Schad, 501 US at 633.
107 553 F2d 453 (5th Cir 1977).
108 Id at 458.
109 Id.
110 See id.
111 See Schad, 501 US at 634-35 (collecting cases).
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The Schad Court rejected the Gipson conceptual grouping ap-
proach as "too indeterminate to provide concrete guidance to courts
faced with verdict specificity questions."11 2 The Court noted that "con-
ceptual groupings may be identified at various levels of generality, and
we have no a priori standard to determine what level of generality is
appropriate."
11 3
After rejecting the dissent's policy of requiring maximum verdict
specificity,"' the Court abandoned the attempt to come up with a con-
clusive test, convinced of "the impracticability of trying to derive any
single test for the level of definitional and verdict specificity permitted
by the Constitution.". 5 Instead, the Court's "sense of appropriate
specificity is a distillate of the concept of due process with its demands
for fundamental fairness and for the rationality that is an essential
component of that fairness. 11 6 In making this due process analysis,
courts should exercise judicial restraint, since definitions of crimes
''represent value choices more appropriately made in the first instance
by a legislature than by a court." 7
Considering the alternative theories of premeditated first-degree
murder and felony murder, the Court affirmed the conviction. In mak-
ing its decision, the Court noted that "[t]he use here of due process as
a measurement of the sense of appropriate specificity assumes the im-
portance of history and widely shared practice as concrete indicators
of what fundamental fairness and rationality require."t 8 The case for
not requiring specificity was particularly strong here, where premedi-
tated and felony murder had long been alternative theories for first-
degree murder. The Court also discussed the potential moral equiva-
lence of the two acts, a premeditated murder and a shooting during an
armed robbery.' 9 Although affirming the conviction, the Court added,
"We do not, of course, suggest that jury instructions requiring in-
creased verdict specificity are not desirable .... We hold only that the
Constitution did not command such a practice on the facts of
this case. '
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia criticized the Court's opinion.
He argued that only the endorsement of history supported the Court's
112 Id at 635.
113 Id.
114 Id at 636-37 (arguing that the dissent's test is insufficiently respectful of state legisla-
ture's crime definitions, which the Court is required to respect).
115 Id at 637.
116 Id (citation omitted).
117 Id at 638.
118 Id at 640.
119 Id at 643-44.
120 Id at 645.
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contention that juror agreement was not needed." Discussing the rule
that jurors need not agree upon the mode of commission, he also
noted that this rule was "not only constitutional ... [but] probably in-
dispensable in a system that requires a unanimous jury verdict to con-
vict.'" He was extremely critical of the Court's moral equivalence ar-
guments:
Perhaps moral equivalence is a necessary condition for allowing
such a verdict to stand, but surely the plurality does not pretend
that it is sufficient. (We would not permit, for example, an indict-
ment charging that the defendant assaulted either X on Tuesday
or Y on Wednesday, despite the "moral equivalence" of those
two acts.)1n
Four justices dissented in Schad. Writing for the dissenters, Justice
White criticized a conviction where "it is entirely possible that half of
the jury believed the defendant was guilty of premeditated murder
and not guilty of felony murder/robbery, while half believed exactly
the reverse..... White, while agreeing that a state is surely entitled to
deference in defining the elements of the offense, argued that the state
had then defined different elements for premeditated murder and fel-
ony murder and must be held to its definition. '
II. PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT APPROACHES AND A SOLUTION:
REQUIRING GREATER SPECIFICITY
This Part describes the problems with the current approaches
used by the California and Kansas courts. It then proposes that courts
should generally instruct juries that they must agree on specifics. Due
process and fairness concerns gleaned from the criminal law context
favor specificity. Moreover, requiring specificity will foster better de-
liberation. In implementing this policy, judges should make an excep-
tion in cases in which res ipsa loquitur applies. In all other cases, since
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (and similar state rules)'2 give
121 Id at 651 (Scalia concurring) ("If I did not believe that" this practice conformed with
due process, since it is as old as the common law and still in existence in the majority of states, "I
might well be with the dissenters in this case.").
122 Id at 650.
123 Id at 651.
124 Id at 655 (white dissenting).
125 Id at 657-58. White noted that even the prosecutor in his closing statement defined dif-
ferent elements for the two types of first-degree murder: premeditated murder, requiring killing,
malice, and premeditation; and felony murder, requiring that a death be caused and that that
death be caused in the commission of a felony. Id at 653-54.
126 FRCP 49; Hazard, Tait, and Fletcher, Pleading and Procedure at 1230 (cited in note 30)
(noting that most states have a procedure for special verdicts or general verdicts with interroga-
tories).
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judges great discretion in determining the level of specificity appro-
priate in special verdicts or general verdicts with interrogatories,
judges should use those tools to require juries to reach agreement on
specifics.
A. Problems with the Approaches in California and Kansas
One threshold problem is that most courts have failed to address
the important issue of how specifically jurors need to agree, although
it must arise often. Those courts that have addressed the issue have
proposed unsatisfactory solutions. First, there is no real agreement
among the courts that have looked at the issue. Although the Kansas
and California courts might often decide specificity cases in the same
way, the approaches are so different that it is not hard to imagine
cases in which they would reach different conclusions. Indeed, it is
somewhat difficult to predict how the Kansas commonsense approach
would come out in any difficult case.
Another problem with most of the current approaches is that
they reject specificity requirements too quickly. The courts' and schol-
ars' analyses fail to take into account the effects that allowing dis-
agreement will have on deliberation and verdicts, effects that raise
concerns about due process and fairness.'2 If specificity is not re-
quired, jurors can render verdicts without fully fleshing out the differ-
ences among them.
The approach in California is particularly unsatisfactory for a
number of reasons. First, the definitions of primary rights and cause of
action can lead to rather arbitrary line-drawing. '2 Moreover, the defi-
nition of the primary right in Stoner led to a potentially incorrect ver-
dict. Several of the acts alleged by Stoner were discrete events, taking
place at different times.9 If the jury did not agree on which of these
discrete events Stoner had actually proven, it suggests there might be
some flaws in her story.l" Nonetheless, the jury found in her favor. It
seems plausible that the jurors were partly moved by compassion for a
sympathetic plaintiff. The potential for decisions based on sympathy
127 See Part III.B.2.
128 The Supreme Court has disapproved of a somewhat similar approach in the criminal law
context-the conceptual groupings approach advanced in Gipson, 553 F2d at 458. See text ac-
companying notes 107-13 for a description of Gipson and the Supreme Court's rejection of it.
See note 140 and accompanying text for a comparison of Stoner and Gipson.
129 For instance, Stoner alleged that the adoption agency misrepresented to her that her
counseling would be fully confidential. Stoner, 54 Cal Rptr 2d at 247. She also alleged that the
agency misrepresented the legal effect of certain papers she was told to sign while in labor. See
id.
130 Presumably for many of the events, Stoner was the primary or even sole witness for the
plaintiff Thus, if the jurors did not agree on which of the acts she alleged were proven, they all
must have had some doubts about her credibility as a witness.
[69:379
Specificity and Jury Agreement
for the plaintiff or even more pernicious grounds such as prejudice
against a defendant is one of the strongest factors militating for a re-
quirement of specificity.'
B. Lessons from the Criminal Law Context
1. Distinguishing Schad: specificity is not required in the civil
law context.
Most jurisdictions generally allow jurors to issue guilty verdicts
without specific agreement on underlying facts.'3 Therefore, the Stoner
court reasoned that the civil law context should not impose a stricter
requirement since the criminal law usually offers greater protections
for the criminal defendant than the civil law does for the civil defen-
dant.'
The Stoner court's reasoning was incorrect for a number of rea-
sons. Judges deciding cases in the criminal context have been com-
pelled to reach certain conclusions because of criminal statutes. For
example, the Schad Court held that criminal defendants had no consti-
tutional right to specific agreement and the statute was clear in deny-
ing a specificity requirement.3 Judges deciding civil matters are gen-
erally not constrained by statutes in this way; thus, they can make the
best policy decision on specificity.
Schad relied on legislative intent to determine what level of
specificity was required.' 5 It was not a decision about what level of
specificity would be appropriate if the Supreme Court were free to
make its own determination. Indeed, in Schad, the Court noted that
more agreement might well be desired and that the legislature's for-
mulation might not be the best, normatively speaking.3 Thus, al-
though Schad and other criminal law decisions held that specificity
was not required, this does not mean that specificity is not desirable in
the civil law context.
The Schad analysis of legislative intent does not apply in the civil
law context. Although state legislatures have passed some legislation
regarding tort law, much tort law is based on common law prece-
131 See text accompanying notes 144-45. See also Hans and Vidmar, Judging the Jury at
131-48 (cited in note 3) (discussing how sympathy and prejudice sometimes influence jury ver-
dicts).
132 See, for example, Stoner, 54 Cal Rptr 2d at 249-50 (collecting cases).
133 Id at 251-52.
134 Schad, 501 US at 645.
135 Id at 638 ("Respect for this legislative competence counsels against judicial second-
guessing.").
136 Id at 645 ("We do not, of course, suggest that jury instructions requiring increased ver-
dict specificity are not desirable.").
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dents.'3 Indeed, legislatures do not have the same sort of interests in
legislating in the civil law context that they have when legislating
against criminal behavior. Cases like Schad recognize that state legis-
latures' decisions in defining crimes are entitled to deference because
of the state's interest in convicting criminals.'m Although the state's in-
terest in conviction may be balanced with some interest in the due
process rights of criminal defendants, it is the courts that usually en-
force such rights, not the state legislatures.'9 In the civil context, the
state generally does not have the same interest in favoring either
plaintiffs or defendants, so an analysis deferring to the legislature does
not make sense.
Thus, since the legislature's view of specificity in the civil law con-
text is not especially well developed, and since the legislature does not
have the same interests in the civil law as it does in convicting crimi-
nals, the best normative rule should be followed. Backing for specific-
ity in the civil context comes from the Supreme Court's explicit rejec-
tion of Gipson's conceptual grouping test as "too indeterminate to
provide concrete guidance to courts faced with verdict specificity
questions."' This same criticism can be leveled against the Stoner
court's adoption of the primary rights theory. Similarly, Cleveland's in-
tuitive approach gives even less guidance to courts struggling with the
issue of specificity.
Schad also does not require specificity in the civil law context be-
cause such a requirement would not systematically disadvantage the
plaintiff in the way that it would systematically disadvantage the
criminal prosecutor. The Stoner court assumes that requiring specific-
ity would work to the detriment of plaintiffs,14' and indeed, in Stoner it-
self, that is true. However, requiring specificity will sometimes work to
help plaintiffs, such as when defendants allege multiple sets of facts as
defenses. There is certainly an empirical question whether defendants
or plaintiffs will receive more of the actual benefits of requiring speci-
ficity; however, it is not clear ex ante whether requiring specificity will
help the defendant or the plaintiff in any particular case.
137 Dobbs, Law of Torts at 1 (cited in note 17) ("Tort law is predominantly common law.").
138 Schad, 501 US at 649 (Scalia concurring) ("[T]he general rule that when a single crime
can be committed in various ways, jurors need not agree upon the mode of commission ... is not
only constitutional, it is probably indispensable in a system that requires a unanimous jury ver-
dict to convict."). See also id at 638 (majority) ("It goes without saying that preventing and deal-
ing with crime is much more the business of the States ... and that we should not lightly construe
the Constitution so as to intrude upon the administration of justice by the individual States.").
139 Indeed, because the state is actually the prosecutor in criminal cases, it have may have
an interest in tilting the balance in its own favor when defining crimes.
140 Schad, 501 US at 635.
141 Stoner, 54 Cal Rptr 2d at 252-54.
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2. Due process and fairness concerns from the criminal
law context.
Due process concerns also support specificity. Subsequent to
Schad, the Supreme Court has recognized that fairness requires limits
on the amount of disagreement that can be allowed in the criminal
context. In Richardson v United States,4 the Court required juror una-
nimity on the three particular violations that fell under the continuing
criminal enterprise statute, since to do otherwise might aggravate the
danger of verdicts based on something other than the facts.'43
Allowing disagreement in the civil context may also cover up in-
appropriate factors that may influence juries in civil verdicts to return
verdicts in favor of plaintiffs despite disagreement on the facts. One
much discussed factor that does sometimes seem to influence juries is
the deep-pocket effect.'" The deep-pocket effect suggests that jurors
award larger awards to plaintiffs suing wealthy defendants, particu-
larly corporations.4 ' Allowing jury disagreement would presumably
only enhance the deep-pocket effect.
C. Additional Benefits of Specificity
The civil jury remains more of a factfinding and less of a
lawmaking body than the criminal jury. Special verdicts may not ordi-
narily be submitted to criminal juries.'" Thus, having jurors agree on
specific facts is entirely in line with their factfinding strengths. Nor
does agreement on specific facts mean that mixed law-fact questions
like negligence are being taken away from jurors, since they may still
answer such questions; they need only agree on the specifics behind
the elements.
This solution may also help to improve the quality of the civil
jury's deliberation. Several procedural innovations in the civil jury
may already have affected the quality of jury deliberations in a nega-
tive way. The movement from unanimity to a form of majority verdict
142 526 US 813 (1999).
143 Id at 819 (noting that if unanimity is not required, this may "cover up wide disagreement
among the jurors about just what the defendant did, or did not, do" and "aggravate[ ] the risk
(present at least to a small degree whenever multiple means are at issue) that jurors, unless re-
quired to focus upon specific factual detail, will fail to do so, simply concluding from testimony,
say, of bad reputation, that where there is smoke there must be fire").
144 See MacCoun, Inside the Black Box at 162-63 (cited in note 52) (discussing the deep-
pocket effect and suggesting that it is better characterized as a "corporate identity effect" be-
cause juries seem more influenced by the presence of a corporate defendant than an individual
with the wealth equivalent to a corporation).
145 Id.
146 United States v Spock, 416 F2d 165, 180 (1st Cir 1969) (noting that although special ver-
dicts are an everyday occurrence in civil trials, they face a formidable array of objections in the
criminal context).
2002]
The University of Chicago Law Review
seems to change the quality of deliberation." Smaller juries may pro-
vide less diversity in deliberation.'W Requiring specificity will encour-
age better deliberation, since juries will not be able to render a verdict
without reaching genuine agreement. Although this may cause slightly
longer deliberations, better deliberations and verdicts are worth the
cost."9
Deliberation on specifics should also improve the quality of ver-
dicts whether jurors use quantitative methods or the story model in
reaching their decisions." Both models of jury behavior focus on a ju-
ror's decision before deliberation. With the story model, requiring
agreement will force jurors to reconsider the plausibility of their story
and perhaps to include facts that they have left out."' With meter-
reading models, requiring agreement should lead to discussion that
will encourage jurors to reevaluate evidence that they may have dis-
counted or ignored. 2
D. Implementation
Few courts have considered the appropriate level of specificity,
though surely it is an issue that often arises in jury trials."2 Litigants
should address this issue when presenting evidence and requesting in-
structions. Judges should fashion instructions that consider this issue.
One significant exception to the general desirability of specificity
is res ipsa loquitur cases. The nature of a res ipsa loquitur instruction
makes it clear why specificity cannot be required in such cases. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts explains:
147 Hans and Vidmar, Judging the Jury at 175 (cited in note 3) (noting that studies suggest
that when unanimity is required, juries are more thorough in their evaluation of the evidence,
minority jurors participate more actively in the discussion, and the jurors are more satisfied with
the final verdict).
148 Id at 170 (explaining Justice Blackmun's conclusion in Ballew v Georgia, 435 US 223,
232-38 (1978), that empirical data has shown that smaller juries are less likely to engage in effec-
tive group deliberation, to represent different views in the community to counteract various bi-
ases, and to produce accurate verdicts).
149 See Wiggins and Breckler, 14 L & Psych Rev at 6 (cited in note 45) (noting that special
verdicts may be inefficient, but that this seems a small price to pay for higher-quality, more ra-
tional jury decisions).
150 See Part I.C.1.
151 The strength of a story depends partly on its coverage; a story that includes more facts
revealed at trial will, other things being equal, be more convincing than a story including fewer
facts. See Pennington and Hastie, The Story Model for Juror Decision Making at 198 (cited in
note 46).
152 See David A. Schum and Anne W. Martin, Formal and Empirical Research on Cascaded
Inference, in Reid Hastie, ed, Inside the Juror: The Psychology of Juror Decision Making 136,169
(Cambridge 1993) (describing a study in which subjects who had already formed opinions about
how to decide a case then treated testimony contradicting these formed opinions as either value-
less or corroborative).
153 Since litigants may plead in the alternative, many plaintiffs no doubt argue multiple
theories of liability and many defendants no doubt argue multiple defenses.
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It may be inferred that harm suffered by the plaintiff is caused by
negligence of the defendant when: a) the event is of a kind which
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence; b) other
responsible causes, including the conduct of plaintiff and third
persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence; and c) the
indicated negligence is within the scope of the defendant's duty
to the plaintiff."4
Thus, since the very essence of res ipsa loquitur is to recognize
certain proof problems facing the plaintiff and to remove those prob-
lems by allowing an inference,'" specificity could not possibly be re-
quired. With such a case, there are no specifics to agree upon.
The Restatement leaves discretion in the hands of the judge to
determine whether the inference can reasonably be drawn or whether
it must be drawn."6 If the court determines that different conclusions
can be reasonably reached, the decision must be left in the hands of
the jury.' This Comment supports leaving this decision in the hands of
the judge. If the judge thinks a res ipsa loquitur instruction is appro-
priate, he should give it; if not, he should instruct the jurors that they
must agree specifically.
The choice of verdict form is potentially very important in cases
where specificity of agreement is an issue. In such cases, it may be ap-
propriate for a judge to use his discretion to require special verdicts or
general verdicts with interrogatories in order to question the jury. In
that way, the judge can ensure that jurors are agreeing with the re-
quired degree of specificity.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has evaluated the current approaches to specific-
ity of agreement in the civil law context. It proposes that jurors should
ordinarily have to agree on the facts of the case with greater specific-
ity. Due process and fairness concerns, as well as the purpose and
strengths of the civil law jury, support specificity. Moreover, because
special verdicts and other tools give judges great discretion in crafting
instructions, judges can easily implement a policy of asking jurors to
agree on underlying facts.
154 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D (ALI 1965).
155 Richard A. Epstein, Cases and Materials on Torts 294 (Aspen 6th ed 1995) (noting that
the function of res ipsa loquitur is to aid the plaintiff in proving the elements of a negligence case
by circumstantial evidence).
156 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D.
157 Id.
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